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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PROPERTY-COASTAL SHORES-PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
UPHELD OVER CLAIMED PUBLIC RIGHT TO RECREATIONAL
USE OF BEACH-IMPLIED DEDICATION, EASEMENT BY PRE-
SCRIPTION, PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH CUSTOM AND GRANT,
AND DOCTRINE OF SUBMERGENCE NOT APPLICABLE. DEPART-
MENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES V. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF
OCEAN CITY, 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975).
Faced for the first time with the question of the rights of private
property owners versus the public in the dry sand portion of Ocean
City's beaches, the Maryland Court of Appeals resolved recent
companion cases' in favor of private property rights. Although the
trend of modern decisions has been to employ legal doctrines
supportive of public recreational rights,2 a majority of the court of
appeals could find no factual or doctrinal basis for protecting the
public's recreational use of Maryland's coastal shores.
In DNR v. Ocean City, the court upheld the right of a developer to
construct a four-story condominium on the dry sand portion of the
beach 3 at 71st Street in Ocean City, Maryland. In DNR v. Cropper, the
1. Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d
630 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DNR v. Ocean City ]; Department of Natural Resources v.
Cropper, 274 Md. 25, 332 A.2d 644 (1975) [ hereinafter cited as DNR v. Cropper].
2. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 723.2[1], at 412.21 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as 5 POWELL].
3. The disputed dry sand portion of the beach consists of the area between the mean high
tide line and the vegetation line. To aid the understanding of special terminology used in
shoreline litigation, a diagram and a list of definitions are set forth below. Legal opinions
do not always apply these terms consistently or with scientific accuracy. Here, an attempt
has been made to represent the generally accepted meaning of the words as they logically
apply to the unique physical characteristics of Maryland's coastal shore.
Vegetation line Mean high Mean low
or dune line tide tide
Upland Dry sand Foreshore Atlantic Ocean
I area
(a) The beach is the area between the ocean and the upland. A beach consists of two
main areas, the foreshore and the dry sand area. 5 POWELL, supra note 2, 723.2[ 1 ], at
412.22. The beach is sometimes more narrowly defined as the tidelands, the area where
the tide flows and reflows. See 2 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 612 (1964).
(b) The foreshore is the strip of land between the low and high water marks which is
alternately covered and uncovered by the flow of the tide. Id. at 565. "Shore,"
"sea-shore" and "beach" are often used to describe the same area as the foreshore.
(c) The dry sand portion of the beach consists of the area between the mean high tide
line and the vegetation line. 5 POWELL, supra note 2, 723.2[ 1 ], at 412.22 n.10.
(d) The vegetation line is the extreme seaward boundary of the natural vegetation
that spreads continuously inland. It marks the border between the dry sand beach and the
adjoining upland. Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 565 n.9 (1970).
court likewise sustained the right of a landowner to erect a house on
the dry sand portion of the beach at 136th Street. In both cases the
court rejected arguments that sought judicial enforcement of the
public's right to use the dry sand area of the beach.
Combined with the severe beach erosion4  and the increased
commercial development 5 that have taken place in Ocean City, judicial
reluctance to acknowledge this public right places the recreational use
of Ocean City's beaches in jeopardy. Aware of this threat, the General
Assembly has enacted legislation that prohibits construction activity on
much of Ocean City's shore.6 There is, nevertheless, considerable doubt
that this legislation will protect all of Ocean City's beaches from further
encroachment by developers.7
Because the facts of the two cases do not differ significantly, and
because the legal issues in both are the same, a complete development
of DNR v. Ocean City will facilitate a discussion of the problem of
public rights in Ocean City's beaches, an analysis of the court of
appeals' treatment of the problem, and a brief examination of the
legislature's response.
THE FACTUAL SITUATION
On February 7, 1972, E. T. Park, Inc. (Park) filed a Petition for
Injunction in the Circuit Court for Worcester County to enjoin the
In Ocean City, the vegetation line is practically identical with the dune line. Janney,
Recreational Beaches: The Right to a Scarce Resource, 3 U. MD. L. J. 121, 133 n.7
(1973).
(e) The dune line is the highest point of the primary dune. Since 1962, the dune line
in Ocean City is more easily identified as a result of reconstruction efforts by the Army
Corps of Engineers, and, as previously noted, generally coincides with the vegetation line.
Id.
(f) The upland is the area adjacent to the beach. It extends landward from the
vegetation line, dune line, or other natural boundary of the dry sand beach. Note, Public
Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 565 n.5 (1970).
(g) The mean high tide line represents the average height of high tidal water on the
shore over a considerable period of time. Id. at 565 n.8.
(h) The mean low tide line represents the average height of low tidal water on the
shore over a considerable period of time. See 2 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES
581 (1964).
(i) Littoral means belonging to the shore, as of seas and great lakes. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1083 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Although the word "riparian" means of or belonging
to the bank of a river, the term is frequently employed in situations involving the shores
of a sea or lake. Despite such commonly accepted usage, it is more accurate to use the
term "littoral" when discussing land which abuts a sea or lake. See 78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters
§ 260 (1975).
4. The beach at 71st Street has been subjected to a process of erosion since 1929. 274 Md. at
4, 332 A.2d at 632. For supporting statistical data, see notes 38-41 infra and
accompanying text.
5. See Janney, Recreational Beaches: The Right to a Scarce Resource, 3 U. MD. L.J. 121
(1973) [ hereinafter cited as Janney ].
6. Law of April 1, 1975, ch. 91, [1975] Laws of Md. 757, amending MD. ANN. CODE, Nat.
Res. Art., § 8-1101 (1974) (codified at MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., § 8-1101 (Supp.
1975)), and enacting MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., § 8-1105.1 (Supp. 1975).
7. See notes 135-42 infra and accompanying text.
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construction of a four-story condominium on two oceanfront lots
located at 71st Street in Ocean City, Maryland, and owned by 71st
Street, Inc. (the developer).' Park, corporate owner of land situated
behind and inland from the oceanfront lots owned by the developer,
contended that it, along with the public, had acquired an easement for
use as a public beach of the area between the mean low water mark on
the east and the line of vegetation on the west.9 Park alleged that the
proposed condominium, with its eastern front abutting the Ocean City
building limit line,"0 would be almost entirely east of the dune line,
which in this case is identical to the line of vegetation." Park
contended, moreover, that the building limit line virtually eliminated
portions of the public beach, because the wave wash at normal high tide
extended beyond the building limit line, thereby leaving no dry sand
beach for use by the public. 2 The State of Maryland through its
Department of Natural Resources was permitted on petition to
8. Park filed its petition against the Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, Brady Bounds
(building inspector for Ocean City), 71st Street, Inc. (the developer), and George Bert
Cropper (the developer's builder). Park's petition sought to enjoin both the issuance of a
building permit and any construction in the disputed area. Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at
4, Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 332
A.2d 630 (1975). Below is a diagram showing the approximate position of the proposed
condominium in relation to the dune line, the Ocean City building limit line (see note 10
infra), and the mean high water mark. Note that the eastern edge of the proposed




Dune Ocean City Mean high
(or vegetation) building water mark
line limit line
Reference to the diagram at note 3 supra will illustrate the encroachment of the proposed
structure on the dry sand portion of the beach.
9. 274 Md. at 3, 332 A.2d at 632.
10. On April 19, 1971, the Mayor and Council of Ocean City adopted an ordinance
establishing an oceanfront building limit line and prohibiting construction east of that
line. See OCEAN CITY, MD., CODE ch. 36, §§ 36-1 to 36-5 (1975). The line was delineated
through common sense of looking where the ocean was at the present time, how
far it appeared that the high tide washed toward the dune line, and taking
buildings that were built in different areas, and trying to strike a line that a
surveyor could set down on a city map, and the Council taking the position that
this is as far as we want a building out, I think that is the way it was struck.
Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at 142-43 (testimony of Roland E. Powell, City
Councilman). In its Petition for Injunction, Park alleged that the building limit line did
not adequately protect the public beach, because the line ran so close to the mean high
water mark that it dissected the public beach in the area between 70th and 71st Streets.
Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at 2-3.
11. See note 3(d) supra.
12. 274 Md. at 3, 332 A.2d at 632;Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at 2-3.
1976]
intervene as a party plaintiff.1 3 On April 23, 1974, the Circuit Court
for Worcester County issued a decree denying the requested injunctive
relief. The State and Park appealed to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, and, on motion of petitioners, the Maryland Court of Appeals
granted certiorari.
In a six-to-one opinion, with Judge Eldridge dissenting, the court of
appeals affirmed the lower court decree, rejecting the theories by
which petitioners sought to establish a right of public use in the dry
sand beach. The court held 1) that there had been neither an express
nor an implied dedication of any area within the developer's lot line,
2) that the facts failed to establish that the public had obtained an
easement by prescription, 3) that, under the facts, neither custom nor
grant could support a public right which would deny to the owner a use
permitted by law and local regulation, and 4) that title to the
oceanfront lots did not revert to the State as a result of temporary
flooding in 1962.14
In reaching its, conclusion, the court briefly reviewed the history of
the lots in question, but, as noted in the dissent, failed "to give
sufficient weight to the exceptional nature of the ocean beach, the
13. Permission was granted pursuant to MD. R.P. 208 b 2 by reason of the Department of
Natural Resources' authority to regulate activity affecting wetlands (MD. ANN. CODE,
Nat. Res. Art., § 9-101 et seq. (1974)) and its duty to safeguard the natural resources of
the State.
14. In DNR v. Cropper, the state advanced, and the Court of Appeals rejected, the same
arguments that were presented in DNR v. Ocean City. DNR v. Cropper resulted from an
attempt by the Department of Natural Resources to enjoin George Bert Cropper from
constructing a house on his oceanfront lot at 136th Street in Ocean City. As in DNR v.
Ocean City, the proposed structure was within the owner's lot lines and conformed with
the Ocean City building limit line, but again the proposed building was almost entirely
east of the dune line constructed after the storm of 1962. As a result of erosion, the
beach at 136th Street had been narrowed to the point that the mean high water mark
was within Mr. Cropper's eastern lot line. The State contended, therefore, that allowing
construction of the house beyond the dune line would interfere with public use of the
beach.
The Court of Appeals relied on its holdings in DNR v. Ocean City to dispose of the
State's arguments based on the doctrines of public trust and submergence. With respect
to the State's claim that the area within the owner's lot lines had been dedicated to
public use, the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the lower court that there had
been no proof of an intention to dedicate any of Mr. Cropper's property. The majority
opinion noted that the original plats covering the disputed area had designated the area
adjacent to the eastern lot lines as a paper street and as a beach. However, the court
found it unnecessary to rule on the legal effect of the original plats, because the area
designated as a street or beach had been subsequently covered by water. With respect to
the claimed public right of use based on a prescriptive easement, the court pointed out
that prior to 1962 the dune line was forty feet east of its present location. The Court of
Appeals again relying on the lower court's findings, concluded that there was no
competent evidence of a continuous and uninterrupted use by the public of the area
between the dune line and mean high water for the requisite twenty year period.
Therefore, the public had not acquired a right to use that area through prescription. As
in DNR v. Ocean City, the majority opinion characterized the State's effort to protect
the public's use of the disputed area as an infringement on an owner's right to make an
otherwise lawful use of his property. Judge Eldridge dissented for the same reasons as
expressed in DNR v. Ocean City.
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various circumstances surrounding its use, and the historic and
compelling public interest in the ocean beach."'" In order to evaluate
the efficacy of the majority's holding within the context of these
unique factors, a discussion of relevant scientific and historical
considerations precedes further analysis of the majority opinion.
SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
Ocean City is located on Fenwick Island, one of a system of barrier
islands' 6 stretching from New England to Florida.' 7 In general terms,
barrier islands are formed by the deposition of sand generated by
offshore wave action, and are nourished by wind action and sand
drift.I'
Starting at the water and moving inland, the visible configuration of
a barrier island consists of the foreshore, the dry sand area, dunes, and
upland.' 9 In addition to aesthetic and recreational advantages, this
arrangement provides storm protection for the area beyond the dunes.
The beach, as the primary means of protection, acts to dissipate the
energy of waves, while the dunes offer a secondary line of defense for
landward structures.2 °  Clearly, the preservation of these natural
barriers is necessary for man's continued enjoyment of Fenwick Island.
There are, however, a number of factors that threaten the existence
of this natural system. The most obvious danger is storm activity in the
form of hurricanes and northeasters."' Erosion has also occurred at an
alarming rate.22 There is, moreover, evidence that indicates that the
island in its natural state would tend to migrate, that is, it would move
toward and eventually merge with the mainland.23 Finally, a continu-
ing rise in sea level signals further infringement by the sea upon present
shoreline areas."
15. 274 Md. at 15, 332 A.2d at 639 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
16. A barrier island is an
[ e ]longate island formed as a result of wave processes. Examples typically parallel
the coast, are commonly separated from the nearby mainland by a lagoon or bay.
Surplus sand may accumulate in dunes to the rear of an outer beach. In places
these dunes may be breached by wave overwash, which transplants sand toward
the lagoon to accumulate as a barrier flat. R. RUSSELL, GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED
IN FLUVIAL, DELTAIC, AND COASTAL MORPHOLOGY AND PROCESSES 7 (Louisiana State
Univ. Studies, Coastal Studies Series No. 23, 1969).
17. 274 Md. at 4, 332 A.2d at 632. See Janney, supra note 5, at 121-22.
18. For a more detailed discussion of the process, see Janney, supra note 5, at 122.
19. See diagram at note 3 supra.
20. Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at 188 (testimony of Turbid H. Slaughter, Geologist,
Maryland Geological Survey).
21. See Janney, supra note 5, at 123 and notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 38-41 infra and accompanying text.
23. Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at 167-70 (testimony of Turbid H. Slaughter). Man-made
structures and pilings driven into the sand serve to prevent the migration of Fenwick
Island, but at the same time may be causing beach erosion. Janney, supra note 5, at 122.
24. See Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at 167; Hicks, On the Classification and Trends of Long
Period Sea Level Series, 40 SHORE AND BEACH 20 (1972).
Viewed together, these factors pose a serious threat to Fenwick
Island. Encroachments by man, such as that proposed by the developer
in DNR v. Ocean City, increase the danger, not only to public
recreational rights, but also to the integrity and stability of the beaches
and dunes themselves.25  The particular history of the 71st Street area
demonstrates the nature and extent of the problem.
HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A system of barrier islands has existed seaward of the Delaware-
Maryland mainland for at least the past 4500 to 5000 years. 2 6
Notwithstanding the appropriation of land from Native Americans,
2 7
the legal ownership of Fenwick Island, and of all land in Maryland, is
recognized as having begun with the Charter of Maryland in 1632.28 In
his proprietary grant to Cecil Calvert, Charles I included all the islands
within 34.5 miles of Maryland's easternmost shore.2 9 The grant was
25. See Janney, supra note 5, at 123; Joint Record Extract, vol. 2, at 203-04 (testimony of
Robert W. Linder, Civil Engineer, Army Corps of Engineers), 288-91, 295 (testimony of
Marshall T. Augustine, Sedimentation Specialist, Maryland Department of Water
Resources).
26. NATURAL RESOURCES INSTITUTE, UNIV. OF MD., CONTRIBUTION No. 446, ASSATEAGUE
ECOLOGICAL STUDIES, FINAL REPORT PART I, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION 18 (Oct.1970).
27. European nations acquired title to lands on the American continent by reason of
discovery and conquest, a judicially recognized "rationalization of the way things were
and supposedly had to be." Note, Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands
They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655, 659 (1975). In
an early case, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that discovery gave
title to the European nations by whose subjects, or under whose authority, land was first
discovered. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). A review of
history led Mr. Chief Justice Marshall to the following conclusion:
Thus, all the Nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this
continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognized in others, the
exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.
Id at 584.
One authority reports that the Assateague Indians originally inhabited the land
bordering the Atlantic Ocean in present-day Worcester County. The Assateagues
occupied a larger town on a tract of land near Berlin, Maryland. C. A. Weslager, Indians
of the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia, in 1 THE EASTERN SHORE OF MARYLAND
AND VIRGINIA 47 (C. B. Clark ed. 1950).
28. See Kerpelman v. Board of Pub. Works, 261 Md. 436,445, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (1971). The
Charter of Maryland is set forth in 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 1 (rev. by V. Maxcy
1811). Sir George Calvert explored the upper portions of the Chesapeake Bay and on his
return to England petitioned the King to grant him lands for the establishment of a
colony. Due to Sir George's death, the Charter was issued to his son, Caecilius Calvert,
Lord Baltimore. The Charter remained in force until the Revolution of 1776. 3 F.
THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS 1669 n.(a) (1909).
29. The grant was termed to include all islands within ten marine leagues of Maryland's
easternmost shore. 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 2 (rev. by V. Maxcy 1811).
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subject to a reservation of rights similar to that found in Roman law, 30
under which the shores were common to all men.
3 '
Following the American Revolution, the State of Maryland acquired
all vacant and unowned land within its borders by virtue of its
sovereignty. 32  Subsequent conveyances were by legislative act or by
state patent pursuant to legislative authority. 33 Beginning in 1869, the
state issued a series of patents covering Fenwick Island; the 71st Street
area was included in 1883. 3 ' These patents granted ownership of the
land up to the Atlantic Ocean.
3
1
As the development of Ocean City proceeded, landowners subdivided
large tracts of land and prepared plats delineating lot lines and streets.
According to the recorded plats covering the 71st Street area,
landowners offered to dedicate to the public, as a beach or boardwalk,
land east of their lot lines.3 6 Ocean City accepted these offers, thereby
completing a dedication of the area designated as beach or board-
walk.3 7 It is likely that this dedication would have satisfied public
recreational demands, but a continuing process of erosion has reduced
the beach areas dedicated to public use. From 1929 to 1947 erosion
narrowed the beach at 71st Street by 270 feet;31 from 1947 to 1965
the beach lost an additional 25 feet to erosion.3 9 In 1962 a severe
30. 274 Md. at 11-12, 332 A.2d at 637. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
31. See INSTITUTES 2.1.1; T. SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 90-92 (1922). One
authority briefly summarizes the scope of rights under Roman Law as follows:
Res communes were things whereof no one was owner, and that all men might
use. Such were the air, running water, the sea, and the seashore. The seashore
extended to the highest point reached by the waves in winter storms. The right of
fishing in the sea belonged to all men. Any one could haul up his nets on the
shore, or spread them out to dry, or build a hut for himself. So long as the
structure existed it was private property; but when it fell into ruins the soil again
became common. Every one had the right to prevent construction on the shore
that would interfere with his access to the sea or the beach; ... W. HUNTER,
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65 (F. Lawson ed. 1934).
See also Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From
Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 571, 576 (1971). It is interesting to note that
the scope of rights in the shores of the sea under Roman Law were more extensive than
those presently enjoyed by the citizens of Maryland.
32. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.22 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). See Kerpelman v. Board
of Pub. Works, 261 Md. 436, 445, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (1971).
33. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.23 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
34. Joint Record Extract, vol. 1, at 15, Department of Natural Resources v. Cropper, 274
Md. 25, 332 A.2d 644 (1975). The patents issued by the State begin
with "Lady's Resort to the Ocean" in 1869 covering the land from Division Street
(near the present inlet) north to approximately 15th Street. "Wild Goose Chase"
in 1869 covers from 15th Street to about 33rd Street. Next were "Summer
Retreat" and "Ocean View," both issued in 1883, covering from 33rd to 118th
Streets; and, finally, "Speedwell" in 1885 from 118th Street to the Delaware
Line. Id.
35. Id.
36. 274 Md. at 7, 332 A.2d at 634.
37. Id.
38. 274 Md. at 4, 332 A.2d at 632.
39. Janney, supra note 5, at 133 n.3.
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storm devastated the Ocean City area, nearly cutting an inlet at 71st
Street.40 The resulting erosion made the beach 450 feet narrower than
it was in 1922.4 ' Following the storm of 1962, Worcester County
obtained perpetual easements from property owners as a preliminary
step to a major effort by the Army Corps of Engineers to reconstruct
the dune line.42 Subsequently, the county refused to issue building
permits for construction east of the dune line established by the Corps
of Engineers. 4 3 In 1971, however, after the 71st Street area had been
annexed by Ocean City, the Mayor and City Council adopted an
ordinance designating a building limit line east of the dune line
constructed by the Corps of Engineers.4 4 Although the building limit
line preserved a portion of the beach for public use, it sanctioned
construction on the portion of the beach between the dune line and the
new building limit line, an area for which the county had previously
refused to issue building permits.
It is within this context that Park, later joined by the Department of
Natural Resources, sought to enjoin construction of the developer's
condominium. The proposed structure was within the legal boundaries
of the developer's lots and conformed with the Ocean City building
limit line. 4' Nevertheless, construction of the condominium would
have the practical effect of further diminishing the recreational area of
a beach already severely reduced by erosion.
THE MAJORITY OPINION
Beginning its discussion of legal principles, the court observed that
the State holds the foreshore for the benefit of the public.4 6 This
conclusion is derived from the principle that the states, by virtue of
their colonial sovereignty, succeeded to the ownership of tidelands and
lands beneath navigable waters. 47  As a general rule, the states hold
40. The "storm of 1962" generated fifty mile per hour winds and ten to fifteen foot waves
and inundated most of Fenwick Island. Losses were estimated at seven million dollars.
Janney, supra note 5, at 123.
41. 274 Md. at 4, 332 A.2d at 632.
42. Id., 332 A.2d at 632-33. As a result of the storm of 1962, President Kennedy designated
Ocean City as a national disaster area, thereby making federal funds available for
reconstruction efforts by the Army Corps of Engineers. During the course of the project,
known as "Operation Five-High," the Corps pumped 1,050,000 cubic yards of sand into
the area in order to rebuild the dune line along the entire length of the beach. 274 Md. at
21, 332 A.2d at 642.
43. 274 Md. at 5, 332 A.2d at 633.
44. Id. See note 10 supra.
45. See diagram at note 8 supra.
46. 274 Md. at 5, 332 A.2d at 633.
47. A. Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.3(B), at 192, § 42.1, at 264-67 (R. Clark ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Stone]; 1 V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 2:3, at 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited asENVIRONMENTALRIGHTS
AND REMEDIES ]. See Board of Pub. Works v. Larmar Corp., 262 Md. 24, 35, 277 A.2d
427, 432 (1971).
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these lands in trust for the public,4" and any conveyance is subject to
public rights of navigation and fishing. 9
Turning to the issue of public rights in the dry sand portion of the
beach, the court cited authorities in other jurisdictions which had
found in favor of public rights based on one or more of the following
theories: dedication, ° prescriptive easement,5 ' custom, 2  or public
48. 5 POWELL, supra note 2, 723.2[1], at 412.22; Stone, supra note 47, § 36.4(A), at 197.
See Kerpelman v. Board of Pub. Works, 261 Md. 436, 445, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (1971). See
generally ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 47, §§ 2:1-2:4; Note, Public
Access to Beaches: Common Law Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 369 (1973); Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Alloca-
tion: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 571 (1971); Note, The Public
Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762
(1970); 31 MICH. L. REV. 1134 (1933). For a short discussion of the public trust
doctrine within the context of public recreational rights, see note 53 infra.
49. See, e.g., Kerpelman v. Board of Pub. Works, 261 Md. 436,445, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (1971);
Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 606-07, 6 A. 673, 676-77 (1886); Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Har.
& J. 195 (1821). Today, there is some support for expanding the scope of rights
protected under the public trust doctrine to include public recreational use. See note 53
infra; but see City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr.
23 (1970) in which the Supreme Court of California concluded that special circum-
stances combined with a legislative determination permitted an alienation of tidelands
into absolute private ownership.
50. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970);
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct.
1972), aff'd mem., 45 App. Div. 2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974); Seaway Co. v.
Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See notes 72-89 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the law of dedication.
51. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); cf.
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). See also City of
Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972), vacated, 294
So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974). Despite some doubt that the public may acquire an easement by
prescription, it is generally recognized by the weight of authority that, where the public
has used a way continuously, openly, and adversely to the owner's rights for the
statutory period, the public may acquire an easement for the continued use of that way.
Stone, supra note 47, § 38.2(A), at 225-26. The theory under which the public acquires
these rights is also known as long public user. 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 1211 (rev. 3d ed. 1975); see, e.g., Mount Sinai Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pleasant Manor
Corp., 254 Md. 1, 5-6, 253 A.2d 915, 917 (1969). As a theory for establishing public
rights in beaches, prescriptive easements are probably the weakest because of the
difficulty of establishing the requisite elements. 5 POWELL, supra note 2, 723.2[ 1 ] [ c ],
at 412.28-412.34. See generally Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of
Prescription, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 935 (1973).
52. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). In Thorton v. Hay,
the Supreme Court of Oregon resolved the issue of whether the state had the power to
prevent private landowners from enclosing the dry sand area contained within the legal
description of their oceanfront property. Finding that the public had rights in the dry
sand area along the entire Oregon coastline based on the doctrine of custom, the court
held that the state had the power to protect the public's enjoyment of recreational rights
in that area. Id. at 587-88, 462 P.2d at 673. Although there was evidence to support the
existence of public rights based on prescription, the court chose to rely on custom,
because that doctrine permitted uniform treatment of the entire Oregon shore and
allowed for consideration of the unique nature of the land involved. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d
at 676. The court defined custom as " 'such a usage as by common consent and uniform
practice has become the law of the place, or of the subject matter to which it relates.' "
Id., 462 P.2d at 677. The court then found that the customary use by the people of
Oregon of the dry sand area of the state's beaches met all of Blackstone's requisites of
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trust.13  After briefly reviewing the lower court findings, the court
considered and rejected in turn each of the petitioners' four arguments:
1) The area between the dune line and mean high water mark has
been dedicated to the public.
2) The public has attained the right to use the area between the dune
line and the mean high water mark through prescriptive use.
3) The public's interest in Maryland's coastal shores established
through custom and grant requires that activities violative of the public
trust be proscribed.
4) Land inundated by mean high water reverts to state ownership:
areas reclaimed by governmental efforts remain state property. 4
The court found that the petitioner's second and fourth arguments
were not supported by the facts. With respect to the second argument,
the claim that the public had acquired an easement by prescription, the
court sustained the finding that there was no evidence of use for the
prescriptive period of twenty years.5 5 With respect to the fourth
argument, the claim that the doctrine of submergence combined with
custom. Under the Blackstone analysis, a custom must be ancient, without interruption,
peaceable and free from dispute, reasonable, certain, obligatory, and, finally, not
repugnant or inconsistent with other custom or other law. Id. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *75"*78.
53. In Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972), the issue was whether an oceanfront municipality could charge non-residents
higher fees than they charged residents for the use of a beach area. There was no dispute
that the dry sand beach had been dedicated to public recreational use and that the
foreshore was owned by the state in fee simple. In that context, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that non-residents could not be charged higher fees, because the public
trust doctrine dictates that the beach and ocean waters are open to all on equal terms. Id.
at 308-09, 294 A.2d at 54.
As notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text indicated, tidelands are held by the
sovereign in trust for the public, and any conveyance of those lands is subject to public
rights of navigation and fishing. But according to the New Jersey court, modem
conditions require that the public trust doctrine be extended to afford protection to
public recreational rights. Although some commentators have noted the traditionally
limited scope of the public trust doctrine (see, e.g., Note, Access to Public Municipal
Beaches: The Formulation of a Comprehensive Legal Approach, 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
936, 949-50 (1973)), there is some support for the expansion of that doctrine in light of
modern conditions. See Stone, supra note 47, § 36.4(B), at 200-02. See also ENVIRON-
MENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 47, at §§ 2:4-2:8. For an excellent discussion
of the public trust doctrine as a comprehensive tool in resource management settings, see
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
54. The first part of petitioners' fourth argument states the doctrine of submergence, under
which the littoral owner loses title to lands which are gradually covered by water. See
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d
513, (1970); but cf. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) (title to land
previously submerged but subsequently exposed by rechanneling of river held vested in
riparian owner under federal law). The second part of petitioners' argument contends
that reclamation efforts reinforce the State's claim to previously submerged land.
55. 274 Md. at 9, 332 A.2d at 635. In order to establish an easement by prescription in
Maryland, it is necessary to prove an adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted use for twenty
years. See, e.g., Furman E. Hendrix, Inc. v. Hanna, 250 Md. 443, 445, 243 A.2d 600,
601 (1968).
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state reclamation efforts vested fee simple title in the state, 6 the court
noted that the contested property had only been temporarily flooded
by the storm of 1962.17  Under the doctrine of submergence, land
reverts to state ownership only when it is covered by water as a result
of gradual erosion."8
The dissenting opinion concurred in the majority's analysis of these
two arguments. But, with respect to the petitioners' first and third
claims, there was substantial disagreement. The majority and dissenting
opinions placed differing interpretations on both Maryland's law of
implied dedication 9 and the significance of special factors surrounding
the public's rights to use Maryland's beaches. These differences become
more apparent in the discussion of the dissent, which follows further
analysis of the majority opinion.
Addressing the petitioners' first argument, the majority concluded
that implying a dedication, in the absence of proof of a clear and
unequivocal manifestation of intent to dedicate, contradicted existing
precedent. 6 Noting the distinction between dedication and prescrip-
tion, the majority further commented that implying a dedication solely
from long public use was but a form of prescription and, therefore,
required compliance with the essentials necessary to create prescriptive
rights.6 '
The majority refused to accept the petitioners' third argument that
the public's interest in Maryland's coastal shores, established through
56. This was the only one of petitioners' four arguments which sought to vest the State with
a fee simple title. The other three arguments sought merely to establish and to protect
the public's right to use the dry sand beach.
57. Because the storm of 1962 was of short duration, the court classified it as an avulsion.
274 Md. at 15, 332 A.2d at 638.
58. When the submergence of land is caused by erosion, which is "the gradual and
imperceptible wearing away of the land by the natural action of the elements," the state
succeeds to the ownership thereof; but when the loss of land is caused by avulsion, which
is "the sudden or violent action of the elements, the effect and extent of which is
perceptible while it is in progress," legal title is not affected. In re City of Buffalo, 206
N.Y. 319, 325, 99 N.E. 850, 852 (1912). See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 15.26-15.27 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
59. Dedication is the devotion of land by the owner to public use. An implied dedication
may arise when a landowner's intention to devote his land to public use appears from his
declarations and conduct. For a more detailed discussion of the doctrine, see notes 72-89
infra and accompanying text.
60. 274 Md. at 8, 332 A.2d at 635.
61. It is not difficult to perceive that an acquisition of public rights by long public use of
land without regard to the owner's intent is prescriptive in nature. Thus, for example, the
existence of a public way may be established solely on the basis of an uninterrupted user
by the public for twenty years. Garrett v. Gray, 258 Md. 363, 376-77, 266 A.2d 21, 27
(1970). But to avoid any possible confusion between prescription and dedication, it is
important to remember that no minimum period of public user is required to establish
public rights based on dedication. Stone, supra note 47, § 38.2(B), at 228;see Smith v.
Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 420, 24 A.2d 795, 800 (1942). All that need be shown to
establish a dedication is the landowner's intention to devote his land to public use and
the public's acceptance of the intended donation. Stone, supra note 47, § 38.2(B), at
227; see notes 72-79 infra and accompanying text.
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grant and custom, required the prohibition of activities violative of the
public trust. Under Article XVI of the Charter of Maryland, the King
had reserved to himself, his heirs, and to all his subjects, the liberty of
fishing and the privilege of salting and drying fish, and to that end,
gathering wood and constructing huts and cabins on the shores of the
province. These privileges were to be enjoyed as long as their exercise
did not result in notable injury to the residents or inhabitants of the
province.6 2 Petitioners argued that this grant reasonably included an
exercise of these privileges above the high water mark, since it would be
impractical to engage in the permitted activities in an area subject to
continuous tidal action. They asserted that the imposition of a public
trust over the dry sand beach was necessary to protect these
privileges.6 3 Though it posed several interesting questions of interpreta-
tion, the majority declined to rule on the extent of the rights
encompassed within Article XVI of the Charter, because
[w]hat the petitioners are attempting to do here, under an
assertion of the public's right to picnic and sunbathe on the
dune, is to deny the Developer a use of his property to which he
has an otherwise lawful right: the right to build to Ocean City's
building limit line. This is the "notable damage or injury in any
wise to be done.., to the residents and inhabitants of the same
province in the . . . shores aforesaid . . . ." which Article XVI of
the Charter specifically proscribed.6 4
Turning to the element of custom, the majority discounted the
applicability of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,6" in which the Supreme
Court of Oregon upheld the public right to use Oregon's beaches on the
basis of a custom of public use. The court refused to apply the doctrine
of custom, because the facts failed to show ancient use, one of seven
prerequisites under Blackstone's treatment of the doctrine.6 6 Finally,
the majority rejected petitioners' contention that, because of the
expenditure of public funds in restoring the dune line and because of
recreational and environmental considerations, the area between the
high water mark and the dune line was impressed with a public trust. 67
As reasons for its conclusion, the court cited a lack of evidence of
acquisition by the public of any interest in the contested lots, as well as
a lack of legal authority to support the proposition that such an interest
arises from the expenditure of public funds.6"
62. See 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 8 (rev. by V. Maxcy 1811).
63. 274 Md. at 9-14, 332 A.2d at 636-38.
64. 274 Md. at 13, 332 A.2d at 637.
65. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). Thornton v. Hay is discussed at note 52 supra.
66. 274 Md. at 13, 332 A.2d at 638.
67. Id. at 14, 332 A.2d at 638.
68. Id.
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Underlying the majority's unwillingness to accept petitioners' first
and third arguments or to recognize the unique factors involved in this
case is the understandably strong respect that the court accorded the
right of a private owner to make a lawful use of his property. The
protection of private property rights, however, does not operate in a
vacuum, especially when as delicate and valuable a natural resource as
Maryland's beaches is concerned. In such a case, an equal and perhaps
greater right belongs to the citizens of Maryland-the right to use and to
enjoy that natural resource.6 9 The strength of similar public policy
considerations has caused other courts to uphold these public rights. 70
It would appear, consequently, that resolving the conflict between
private and public rights in this case required a more delicate balancing
of competing interests than a majority of the court of appeals was
inclined to recognize. One member of the court was willing to consider
the public's interest in Maryland's coastal shores, at least as a factor, in
his approach to the problem.
DISSENT: APPLICABILITY OF IMPLIED DEDICATION
Judge Eldridge's dissent focused on the law of implied dedication in
Maryland. Whereas the majority had concluded that the absence of a
clear and unequivocal manifestation of intent to dedicate precluded a
finding of implied dedication, Judge Eldridge's reading of the cases
revealed that
there are few hard and fast rules with respect to implied
dedication under Maryland law, and each situation must be
viewed in light of its own peculiar circumstances.7 1
Dedication is the devotion of land to the public use by an
unequivocal act of the owner manifesting an intent that it be accepted
and used for a public purpose.72 Generally the term is "applied to any
one of many processes by which the owner of an interest in land can
transfer to the public, either ownership, or a privilege of use, of such
interest for a public purpose.""' The doctrine of dedication initially
69. The balance must be struck while keeping in mind that all private property and
privileges are held subject to limitations that may reasonably be imposed upon
them in the public interest. The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to
conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or
upon any substantial group of the people. The owner's right to undisturbed
possession of his property must sometimes give way to an overriding social
interest. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 47, § 2:8, at 38.
70. See notes 50-53 supra.
71. 274 Md. at 19, 332 A.2d at 641 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
72. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.132, at 473 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
73. 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 934, at 361 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 6
POWELL]. For a thorough treatment of the law of dedication, see 11 E. MCQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ch. 33 (rev. 3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
McQUILLIN].
arose in cases of highway uses and has received analogous application in
many other situations.74 Dedication may be based on either statute or
common law.7" In its common law form, dedication may be express or
implied.7 6 In either case, two elements must be present: an offer
manifesting the intent to dedicate and an acceptance of that offer."' In
an early leading case, City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White,7" the
Supreme Court of the United States stated the doctrine somewhat more
broadly:
There is no particular form or ceremony necessary in the
dedication of land to public use. All that is required is the
assent of the owner of the land, and the fact of its being used
for the public purposes intended by the appropriation.7 9
As frequently repeated by the courts of Maryland, the intent on the
part of the owner to dedicate his land is absolutely essential to
effectuate a dedication."0 Such pronouncements, however, do not
solve the inherent difficulty of determining a person's mental disposi-
tion. The answer lies in discovering whether the owner's intention to
dedicate appears from the facts and circumstances in a particular
case.8 ' To reach this determination the court of appeals has enunciated
several principles.8 2  The court has stated that the intention
to dedicate must be established by clear and unequivocal testimony. 83
74. 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1098 (rev. 3d ed. 1975). For example,
land has been dedicated for use by the public as a park, as a playground and recreational
area, as a beach or shoreline area, and for flood control use. Id.
75. 11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 73, § 33.03, at 631-32.
76. Id.
A dedication is express when the intent is manifested by oral or written words,
and is implied when the intent must be gathered from the acts of the dedicator.
Otherwise stated, a dedication is express where the appropriation is formally
declared, and is implied where it arises by operation of law from the owner's
conduct and the facts and circumstances of the case. The substantial difference
between the two consists in the mode of proof. Id. at 632-33.
77. Id. § 33.02, at 628; 6 POWELL, supra note 73, 935, at 365. See Town of Glenarden v.
Lewis, 261 Md. 1, 3, 273 A.2d 140, 141 (1971), and cases cited therein.
78. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832).
79. Id. at 440.
80. Hackerman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 618, 624, 130 A.2d 732, 735
(1957); State Roads Comm. v. Teets, 210 Md. 213, 223-24, 123 A.2d 309, 314 (1956);
Blank v. Park Lane Center, Inc., 209 Md. 568, 574-75, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (1956). See
11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 73, § 33.29, at 693-94.
81. See 11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 73, § 33.29, at 694-95. See also Conway v. Prince George's
County, 248 Md. 416, 418-19, 237 A.2d 9, 11-12 (1968); Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md.
412, 420, 24 A.2d 795, 800 (1942); Canton Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
106 Md. 69, 83-84, 66 A. 679, 680 (1907); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Frick,
82 Md. 77, 83, 33 A. 435, 436 (1895).
82. The Court of Appeals summarized several of these principles in Toney Schloss Properties
Corp. v. Berenholtz, 243 Md. 195, 204-05, 220 A.2d 910, 914 (1966). See 11McQuILLN,
supra note 73, at §§ 33.29-33.41, for a more detailed discussion of the same principles.
83. Toney Schloss Properties Corp. v. Berenholtz, 243 Md. 195, 204, 220 A.2d 910, 914
(1966); Stover v. Steffey, 115 Md. 524, 530, 81 A. 33, 35 (1911); South Balto. Harbor
& Improvement Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 541, 37 A. 27, 28 (1897).
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Any act of the owner clearly manifesting such intention is sufficient. 84
The intention to dedicate may be implied from the conduct of the
owner, 85 so as to estop him from later denying that his intention was
to dedicate.8 6 Long acquiescence in public use may justify the
inference of an intention on the owner's part to dedicate his land. 7 In
short, each case must be decided "by considering the declarations of
the landowner, his intentions as manifested by his acts, and all the
other circumstances of the case." '
The majority opinion in DNR v. Ocean City properly recognized the
necessity of a clear and unequivocal manifestation of intent to dedicate,
but failed to look to the above criteria for assistance in reaching the
difficult determination of the landowner's intent. Judge Eldridge, on
the other hand, emphasized that "each situation must be viewed in light
of its own peculiar circumstances."8 9 This approach not only incor-
porates the judicial guidelines listed above; it also appeals to reason, in
that it allows the unique circumstances of a particular case to play a
part in the decision-making process.
Judge Eldridge listed the circumstances that warranted the conclu-
sion that the public had a right to use the beach at Ocean City:
1. The Charter of Maryland reserved privileges which re-
quired that the public be able to use the dry sand portion of the
beach. 90
Although unwilling to adopt the petitioners' rationale, the majority
acknowledged the force of the argument that the public could not
exercise privileges specially reserved in the Charter, unless the right of
the public to engage in certain activities above mean high water was
84. Lonaconing, M. & F. Ry. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 95 Md. 630, 634, 53, A. 420, 422
(1902), cited with approval in Conway v. Prince George's County, 248 Md. 416, 419,
237 A.2d 9, 11 (1968), Toney Schloss Properties Corp. v. Berenholtz, 243 Md. 195, 205,
220 A.2d 910, 914 (1966), and Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 419, 24 A.2d 795, 800
(1942).
85. Conway v. Prince George's County, 248 Md. 416, 419, 237 A.2d 9, 11 (1968); Smith v.
Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 419-20, 24 A.2d 795, 800 (1942); Lonaconing, M. & F. Ry. v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 95 Md. 630, 634, 53 A. 420, 422 (1902).
86. Blank v. Park Lane Center, Inc., 209 Md. 568, 574, 121 A.2d 846, 848 (1956); Smith v.
Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 419-20, 24 A.2d 795, 800 (1942); Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. Frick, 82 Md. 77, 83, 33 A. 435, 436 (1895); McCormick v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 45 Md. 512, 523 (1877).
87. Canton Co. v. Seal, 144 Md. 174, 178-79, 125 A. 63, 65 (1923). See Smith v. Shiebeck,
180 Md. 412, 419-20, 24 A.2d 795, 800 (1942); 11 McQuILLIN, supra note 73, at
§ 33.31. In Garrett v. Gray, 258 Md. 363, 266 A.2d 21 (1970), the Court of Appeals,
quoting an earlier case, distinguished acquiescence from permissive use:
'Acquiescence is the inactive status of quiescence or unqualified submission to
the hostile claim of another, and is not to be confused with permission, which
denotes a grant of permission in fact or a license.' Id. at 377-78, 266 A.2d at
27-28 (emphasis in original).
88. Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 420, 24 A.2d 795, 800 (1942).
89. 274 Md. at 19, 332 A.2d at 641 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 19-20, 332 A.2d at 641.
recognized. 91 Under traditional doctrine, the sovereign holds the
foreshore in trust for the public, and any conveyance of those lands is
subject to public rights of navigation and fishing.9 2 A logical extension
of the public trust doctrine, in light of the Maryland Charter, permits
the conclusion that any conveyance by the state of the dry sand
portion of the beach is likewise subject to recognized public rights. 9 '
In light of modern conditions, moreover, there seems to be good reason
to expand the scope of protected rights to include public recreational
uses.
94
2. The owners' acquiescence in the public use for many years
of the beach at 71st Street, though not alone constituting an
implied dedication, was an indication of the owners' intent to
dedicate the land to public use.9 s
An owner's acquiescence in the public use of his land may justify an
inference of an intention on his part to dedicate.9 6 In the instant case
there was testimony that the public used the beach for many years,
while there was no evidence that any landowner attempted to prevent
this public use. 97 Judge Eldridge concluded: "While I do not suggest
that mere acquiescence in the use by the public of a landowner's
property, without more, constitutes an implied dedication, nevertheless
it is an important circumstance indicating an intent to dedicate land
such as this to public use." 98
3. The original and revised plats of the developers consis-
tently recognized that "the area immediately adjacent to the
ocean was to be kept as beach." 99
4. Prior to 1938, the beach had been used as a public
road."°°
These two circumstances do not provide direct evidence of the
landowners' intent to dedicate the area in dispute, because the area
originally designated as public beach or boardwalk and used as a public
road was part of a much larger expanse of beach. That area has since
been narrowed by erosion.' 0 ' These factors, however, do reflect at least
a recognition on the part of prior landowners and the public that the
area adjacent to the ocean was a public beach.
91. Id. at 12, 332 A.2d at 637.
92. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 53 supra.
95. 274 Md. at 20, 332 A.2d at 641.
96. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
97. 274 Md. at 20, 332 A.2d at 641.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 20-21, 332 A.2d at 641.
100. Id. at 21, 332 A.2d at 641.
101. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
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5. The expenditure of government funds to preserve the
beach, to keep it clean, and to provide lifeguard and other
services, all indicated that property owners and the public
understood the beach was dedicated to public use.' 2
The fact that landowners knew of the expenditure of public funds
for the maintenance and preservation of the beach, accepted the
benefits of the expenditures, and made no subsequent effort to prevent
public use, raises the strong inference of the owner's intent to dedicate.
Such conduct should at least operate to estop the owners from denying
that their intention was to dedicate. 0 3 The majority noted the lack of
authority for creating a public interest in the disputed land simply as a
consequence of the expenditure of public money.' 4 Petitioners,
however, were not claiming an interest "simply" on the basis of public
expenditures. Rather, they considered these expenditures to be a
factor, relevant to the ultimate determination of the conflict. Courts in
other jurisdictions, moreover, have recognized public expenditures for
the maintenance and protection of beaches as evidence of intent to
dedicate.'s
6. The citizens of the State of Maryland understand that
Ocean City's beaches are open to public recreational use. The
landowner, by allowing public use of the beach and by
accepting the benefits of public expenditures, endorsed this
widely held belief.' 6
This factor is similar to the previous one, but has the added force of
a public policy consideration, which, if not officially articulated, is
commonly assumed. The landowner's conduct reinforced the public's
assumption that they are free to use the beaches of Ocean City.
102. 274 Md. at 21, 332 A.2d at 641-42.
103. The following statement in 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1102, at 583
(rev. 3d ed. 1975) seems particularly applicable:
That the public user has been accompanied by expenditures on the part of
the municipal authorities, to adapt the land to such user, and that the landowner
knew of such expenditures, and acquiesced therein, would appear to be a
consideration indicative of an intention on his part to dedicate, or perhaps
operative to preclude him from denying such intention.
See also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.133, at 474-75 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
Testimony in DNR v. Ocean City showed that government funds were expended to clean
beaches, to furnish lifeguard services, and to provide law enforcement protection. In
addition to the money used to pay for these services, government funds were also spent
to preserve the beach in the 71st Street area. The State and the county erected sand
fences along the dunes and constructed a jetty at 70th Street. The reconstruction of the
dune line after the storm of 1962 cost over one and a half million dollars. 274 Md. at 21,
332 A.2d at 642.
104. 274 Md. at 14, 332 A.2d at 638.
105. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 39, 465 P.2d 50, 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 168
(1970); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 936-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
106. 274 Md. at 21-22, 332 A.2d at 642.
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Based on all six of the above factors, Judge Eldridge concluded that
the landowner and his predecessors in title have recognized the
public's right to use and the public's use of the dry sand beach
to such an extent, that an implied easement to the public for
recreational purposes has been created. None of the above
factors, taken alone, result in this conclusion, nor do any two of
the factors compel this result. But all of the circumstances
evaluated together create a total picture of an implied dedica-
tion by the landowner and an unmistakable acceptance by the
general public. 0 7
This totality of circumstances approach finds support in existing law
and has the added advantage of allowing for the application of
established legal principles to a uniquely modern case.
A similar approach was employed in Seaway Co. v. Attorney
General,'0° where the Texas Court of Civil Appeals sustained a
judgment establishing an easement in the public to use the land
adjoining the Gulf of Mexico from the line of mean low tide to the line
of vegetation for travel and recreational purposes.'0 9 The original
action had been brought by the Attorney General of Texas and a local
District Attorney to enjoin a corporate defendant from erecting barriers
on its property on the seaward side of the vegetation line of the Gulf of
Mexico. The action was brought pursuant to the state "Open Beaches
Bill," which declared it to be thepublic policy of Texas that the people
of the state should have a right of access to and from state-owned
beaches or those areas where the public had acquired an easement by
presciption, dedication, or continuing use in the public." 0 The court of
civil appeals concluded that the evidence supported an implied common
law dedication by the landowner's predecessors in title of the area from
the vegetation line to the mean high tide line."' The court also found
that an easement in the public had been created by prescription," 2 but
rejected a theory based on public trust." 3
In discussing the theory of implied dedication, the court said:
The intent on the part of the owner, however, is not a secret
intent, but is that expressed by visible conduct and open acts of
the owner. If the open and known acts are of such a nature as
to induce the belief that the owner intended to dedicate the
way to the public and individuals act on such conduct, proceed
107. Id. at 22, 332 A.2d at 642.
108. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
109. Id. at 940.
110. Id. at 925-26.
111. Id. at 935.
112. Id. at 937.
113. Id. at 929.
as if there had been in fact a dedication and acquire rights that
would be lost if the owner were allowed to reclaim the land,
then the law will not permit him to assert that there was no
intent to dedicate, no matter what may have been his secret
intent. The act of throwing open property to the public use,
without any other formality, is sufficient to establish the fact of
dedication to the public; and if individuals, in consequence of
this act, become interested to have it continue so, the owner
cannot resume it. "
4
Applying this reasoning to the facts, the Texas court found that the
owner had thrown open the beach to public use, and it had remained
open for over a hundred years.' As further evidence of intent, the
court noted that the county had expended funds to maintain the beach
so the public could use it. Additionally, police officers had patrolled
the beach. Because these activities were carried on openly and for so
long that the owners should have known of them, the court concluded
that they constituted some evidence of intent." 6
Also similar to Judge Eldridge's analysis was Judge Denecke's
concurring opinion in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay." 7 Unable to
accept the majority's application of customary rights," 8 Judge
Denecke advocated an approach that took into consideration the
relevant factors of the case. Though not resting his conclusion on
implied dedication, he found that the following factors, in combina-
tion, supported the public's right to use the beach: 1) long public use of
the dry sand area, not on all of Oregon's beaches, but wherever the
public used the beach; 2) a long and universal belief by the public in the
right to such use; 3) acquiescence by landowners in such use; and 4) the
compelling desirability of the public right to use the dry sand
beach." 9
A final comparison with the most controversial of the implied
dedication decisions, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v.
King,'2 0 will demonstrate the efficacy of Judge Eldridge's application
of that doctrine. In both of these cases, which were consolidated on
appeal,' 2 ' the Supreme Court of California concluded that there had
114. Id. at 936.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 936-37.
117. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
118. See note 52 supra for a summary of the majority opinion in Thornton v. Hay.
119. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 600, 462 P.2d 671, 678-79 (1969).
120. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Gion-Dietz].
The decision in Gion-Dietz produced extensive commentary in legal periodicals-some
favorable and some highly critical. See Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last-At Least They
Lose Their Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 8 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 75, 76
(1971), where the author lists six publications and their evaluations of Gion-Dietz.
121. Gion involved three oceanfront lots adjacent to a public coastal road. The upper portion
of the property was level with the road, while the lower portion dropped sharply to the
beach and ocean. Since about 1900, members of the public parked on the level area and
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been an implied dedication of property rights. This conclusion was
based on the fact that the public had used the land in public ways with
the knowledge of the owners for more than five years (the prescriptive
period in California) without asking or receiving permission and
without objection by anyone.'2 2 What is unique about Gion-Dietz is
the legal basis for the court's conclusion-implied dedication by adverse
use. The court chose this theory, even though it could have rested its
decision on more limited grounds.' 2 3 According to the per curiam
opinion, adverse use for more than five years raises a conclusive
presumption of dedication.' 2 4 In order for the owner to negate the
finding of intent to dedicate based on an uninterrupted public use for
more than five years, he must show that he either granted a license or
made a bona fide attempt to prevent public use.'25 This approach
disregards the essential element of common law dedication-the owner's
intent-and replaces it with a conclusive presumption. It would seem
that adverse use negates any dedicatory intent. It would also seem that
easements created by adverse use should be labeled prescription and not
dedication.' 2 6 Moreover, by placing an affirmative burden of proof on
the landowner to prevent a conclusive presumption from arising, the
court disregarded a previously accepted presumption of permissive
proceeded to the beach for swimming, fishing, and picnicking. For some years the city
had maintained the land by attempting to prevent erosion and by improving the parking
area. The lower court concluded that the City of Santa Cruz, for itself and on behalf of
the public, had an easement for recreational purposes in the three lots.
In Dietz, plaintiffs, on behalf of the public, sought to enjoin a landowner from
closing an unimproved road leading to a beach which had been used by members of the
public for more than a hundred years. The landowner's predecessors in title testified that
they had intended the beach to be open to the public. The lower court concluded that
there had been no dedication of the beach or road.
122. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171
(1970).
123. Note, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to
California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092, 1099 (1971). In both cases there was
evidence of the property owners' intention to dedicate. In Gion, the owners acquiesced
in the maintenance and improvement of their land through public expenditures. In Dietz,
the owner's predecessors in title had testified that they intended for the public to use the
beach. See note 121 supra. Based on this evidence, the court could have found in each
case an implied offer to dedicate land to public use and an acceptance by the public of
that offer. Such an approach would have adhered more closely to the recognized
principles of an implied dedication.
124. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 39, 465 P.2d 50, 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 168
(1970).
125. Id. at 41, 465 P.2d at 57, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
126. Some courts, including those of California apparently, have doubted that the public can
acquire an easement by prescription, because the general public, as such, cannot be the
beneficiary of the fictional "lost grant." Stone, supra note 47, § 38.2(A), at 225-26. But
this obsolete theoretical impediment has not prevented a majority of jurisdictions from
allowing the public acquisition of easements by prescription. Id. at 226. Maryland counts
itself among that majority. Cf. 10 MD. L. REV. 272 (1949). In DNR v. Ocean City, the
majority opinion, commenting on the claimed prescriptive easement in the public, stated
that "the law would support the petitioners, if the necessary facts were available." 274
Md. at 9, 332 A.2d at 635.
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use.' 27 The practical effect of Gion-Dietz was to force landowners to
exclude the public from beaches by resorting to extreme measures.12
In contrast to the questionable holdings of Gion-Dietz, Judge
Eldridge employed a more traditional approach to common law
dedication, consistent with the criteria previously articulated by the
court of appeals.' 29 He was careful to remark that merely permitting
the recreational use of a shore should not give rise to an ease-
ment. 130 He also emphasized that the ocean beach is a unique
geographic phenomenon and a limited natural resource of the
State.' 31 Moreover, the public's involvement with the ocean beach is
"of a different character than that associated with other types of
land.' 32 Finally, his finding of implied dedication would extend only
to that portion of the beach shown by evidence to have been used by




As noted previously, the building limit line originally delineated by
Ocean City ordinance in 1971 in effect sanctioned construction activity
on certain portions of Ocean City's beaches east of the dune
line.' 34 Permitting such construction threatened both the integrity of
the beach system and the public's right to use the dry sand portion of
the beach.' 3 ' These threats resulted in the litigation currently under
discussion.
Shortly after the court of appeals refused to grant the relief sought
by petitioners, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Beach
Erosion Control District Act.' 36 The act amended Section 8-1101 of
the Natural Resources Article and added new Section 8-1105.1. As
amended, Section 8-1101 includes certain findings with respect to
127. See Note, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its
Application to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092, 1103 (1971).
128. One writer points out that the practical impact of Gion-Dietz was contrary to the result
desired by the court. Landowners have erected fences, hired guards, and dynamited paths
leading to beaches in an attempt to show adversity to public use. Instead of opening
more beaches to the public, the decision resulted in the public's being excluded from
many beach areas. See id. at 1094-95.
129. See notes 80-88 supra and accompanying text.
130. 274 Md. at 23, 332 A.2d at 643.
131. Id. at 22, 332 A.2d at 642. Judge Eldridge noted that while the shoreline of the
Chesapeake Bay measures over three thousand miles, Maryland's Atlantic shoreline is
only thirty-five miles long. Id. at 24, 332 A.2d at 643.
132. Id. at 22, 332 A.2d at 642.
133. Id. at 24-25, 332 A.2d at 643-44.
134. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
136. Law of April 1, 1975, ch. 91, (1975) Laws of Md. 757, amending MD. ANN. CODE, Nat.
Res. Art., § 8-1101 (1974) (codified at MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., § 8-1101
(Supp. 1975)), and enacting MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., § 8-1105.1 (Supp. 1975).
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Maryland's coastal beaches. 3 7 Section 8-1105.1 creates and defines a
beach erosion control district on Assateague and Fenwick Islands. 3 ' It
further prohibits certain activities within the district 39 and provides
for the payment of compensation for any taking of property rights. 1
40
The legislation, on its face, provides a solution to the problem posed
by DNR v. Ocean City and DNR v. Cropper. However, a closer reading
of the Beach Erosion Control District Act reveals that the protection
provided by the act against encroachment on Maryland's coastal
beaches is less inclusive on Fenwick Island than it is on Assateague
Island. On Assateague Island the erosion control district extends from
the Atlantic Ocean to the dune line, while on Fenwick Island the
district may extend no further than from the Atlantic Ocean to the
1971 building limit line. Section 8-1105.1(a) defines the dune line at
Assateague as the western boundary of the beach erosion control
district. But the western boundary in Ocean City is defined as:
[A] mutually approved line to be known as the State-Ocean
City building limit line which coincides, more or less, with the
existing Ocean City building limit line and on occasion may
coincide with the crest of the littoral system. The Department
[of Natural Resources], after surveying, platting and recording
the State-Ocean City building limit line, has the authority to
describe by regulation the State-Ocean City building limit
line....
If in fact protection was sought for all of Maryland's coastal beaches,
a logical course of action would have been to move the Ocean City
building limit line westward to coincide with the dune line. Yet, while
recognizing that construction activity endangered the beach system,
Maryland's lawmakers failed to enact a comprehensive remedy, in that
1) the new line coincides "more or less" with the old line, 2) any
137. In addition the General Assembly finds and declares that land movement and
disturbance activities on Atlantic Coast beaches east of certain natural and
physical contours and elevations of the beach endangers the integrity and
continuity of the beach system which includes a dunal system, prevents adequate
maintenance, shore erosion and sediment control, and storm protection of these
and adjacent areas, and results in the imposition of additional financial burdens on
the citizens of the State.... MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., § 8-1101 (Supp.
1975).
138. Id. § 8-1105.1(a).
139. For the purposes of maintaining the Atlantic Coast beaches of the State and the
Beach Erosion Control District, the integrity and continuity of the dunal system
and assuring adequate maintenance thereof, to provide for shore erosion and
sediment control and storm protection, and to minimize structural interference
with the littoral drift of sand and any anchoring vegetation, any land clearing,
construction activity, or the construction or placement of permanent structures
within the Beach Erosion Control District is prohibited.... Id. § 8-1105.1(b).
140. Id. § 8-1105.1(c).
141. Id. § 8-1105.1(a) (emphasis added).
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expansion of the district beyond the old line will require the approval
of Ocean City,1 42 and 3) any discretion that the Department of Natural
Resources might have had under Section 8-1105.1(a) will be further
restricted by the amount of money available to compensate property
owners.
1 4 3
This legislation, in light of political realities, is commendable. At
least the legislature recognizes the threat to our coastal shores. But
because Section 8-1105.1(a) is deliberately underinclusive, there is
considerable doubt that the Beach Erosion Control District Act will
provide the comprehensive protection which is necessary for the
preservation of Ocean City's beaches and the public's right to use
them.1
44
142. Quite naturally, Ocean City property owners would hesitate to approve a new line which
is detrimental to their pecuniary interests. Moving the building limit line so that it
conforms with the dune line would undoubtedly result in a decrease in the value of some
oceanfront properties. Nevertheless, the residents of Ocean City, more than anyone else,
should be aware of the danger of permitting construction beyond the dune line. Most
importantly, such construction threatens dunal integrity and, consequently, the ability
of the beach system to provide storm protection for structures landward of the dunes,
the area where most private property is situated. Secondly, encroaching construction
activity will decrease the aesthetic and recreational value of the beaches, Ocean City's
prime attraction. As a result, vacationers may be forced to look elsewhere for the
satisfaction of their recreational needs.
143. Funds for the compensation of property owners are made available under Program Open
Space. Id. § 8-1105.1(c).
144. On the federal level, proposed legislation promises to establish a national policy with
respect to the beach resources of the nation. H.R. 1676, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
popularly known as the National Open Beaches Act,
declares and affirms that the beaches of the United States are impressed with a
national interest and that the public shall have free and unrestricted right to use
them as a common consistent with State and national conservation policies to the
full extent that such public right may be extended without violating such
property rights of littoral landowners as may be protected absolutely by the
Constitution.... Id. § 315(b).
The Open Beaches Act prohibits interference with the public's use of the nation's
beaches, grants jurisdiction to federal courts in actions related to the protection of public
rights, and authorizes federal grants to the states to carry out the purposes of the Act.
The proposed Act further establishes a rebuttable presumption that the public has the
right to use any area shown to be a beach. For a discussion of the purpose and history of
the National Open Beaches Act, see Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy on Public Use
of the Beaches, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 967 (1973). For relevant background information
see Hearings on Public Access to Beaches Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-25 (1973).
At present, it is unclear what impact the National Open Beaches Act, if passed,
would have in Maryland. To promote State-Federal cooperation, the Act accepts the
substantive state-law position with respect to public and private rights in beaches. C.L.
Black Jr., Constitutionality of the Eckhardt Open Beaches Bill, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 439,
440 (1974). The Open Beaches Act, therefore, could be implemented in Maryland only
to the extent that public rights have been recognized by our courts and legislature. As
previously noted, there are portions of Ocean City's beaches where public rights have
received neither judicial nor legislative recognition. Those areas, apparently, would not
qualify for protection under the Open Beaches Act. It is likely, nevertheless, that passage
of the National Open Beaches Act would provide additional leverage for securing the
public's right to use our coastal shores.
CONCLUSION
DNR v. Ocean City and its companion case presented to the court of
appeals for the first time the issue of the respective rights of private
property owners and the public in the dry sand portion of Ocean City's
beaches. If the majority opinion, in upholding landowners' rights, can
be commended for disallowing the taking of private property, then the
dissenting opinion can be recommended for reasoning through implied
dedication to prevent the taking of public recreational rights in a
unique natural resource. Irrespective of the conclusions reached by the
court, these cases demonstrate that there is a problem in Ocean City.
Both the integrity of the beaches and the public's right to their use are
threatened by a combination of natural forces and developmental
pressures. The ultimate solution of this problem lies in the legislative
articulation of an assumed public policy and the enactment of a
comprehensive and forceful legislative program. Such action will ensure
that future generations of Marylanders will inherit that full measure of
enjoyment of Maryland's coastal shores to which they are entitled.
James J. Nolan, Jr.
Also on the federal level, the Army Corps of Engineers is currently conducting a
study to determine the feasibility of an erosion-control and hurricane-protection project
in Ocean City. A favorable recommendation could result in the implementation of a
proposal under which the Corps of Engineers would erect a bulkhead from North
Division Street to 27th Street and would construct dunes stabilized with beach grass
from 27th Street to the Delaware Line. The net effect of these efforts would be to
provide a minimum beach width of 190 feet along the entire shore. Due to the lengthy
process of study, approval, design authorization, design, congressional action and
presidential approval, however, actual work on such a project would not begin until
1985. Interview with Raleigh Leef, Project Manager for Atlantic Coast, Army Corps of
Engineers, in Baltimore, Maryland, Aug. 25, 1975.
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